LAW AS A NETWORK STANDARD by BURK, DAN L
Yale Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 8
Issue 1 Yale Journal of Law and Technology Article 3
2006
LAW AS A NETWORK STANDARD
DAN L. BURK
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and
Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
DAN L. BURK, LAW AS A NETWORK STANDARD, 8 Yale J.L. & Tech (2006).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol8/iss1/3
THINKPIECE
LAW AS A NETWORK STANDARD
DAN L. BURKt
ABSTRACT
The problem of global information flows via computer networks
raises issues of competition, interoperability, and standard-setting parallel
to those in the analysis of technical standards. Uniform standards, whether
technical or legal, give rise to a constellation of positive and negative
network effects. As a global network based upon the "end to end"
principle of interoperability, the Internet mediates between different,
otherwise incompatible computing platforms. To the extent that law and
technological "code" may act as substitutes in shaping human behavior,
the Internet similarly mediates between different, otherwise incompatible
legal platforms. Much of the legal and social controversy surrounding the
Internet stems from the interconnection of such incompatible legal systems.
As with technical systems, problems of incompatibility may be addressed by
the adoption of uniform legal standards. This, however, raises legal
standard-setting problems similar to those seen in technical standard
setting, where the standard may be "tipped" in favor of dominant
producers. In particular, if law is considered a social product, the benefits
of interjurisdictional competition and diversity may be lost as a single
uniform legal standard dominates the market for law.
Visiting Professor, Cornell Law School; Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly Professor of
Law, University of Minnesota.
Jointly reviewed and edited by YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY and
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS LAW & POLICY.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Global information flows are re-shaping the international
information landscape, channeled from nation to nation through the new
outlets provided by global computer networks. Such movement of
information between jurisdictions invites conflicting application of local
regulations over advertising, intellectual property, hate speech, personal
data, and other communicative content. Understanding the role of the
Internet in this context is crucial to understanding the phenomenon of
transborder information exchanges, as the Internet both forms an active
conduit for much of this information flow, and provides a case study for
understanding information flows outside the network.
Thus, formulating an approach to regulation and control of the
Internet provides a window to conceptualizing the regulation and control of
information flows generally. To a greater extent than any previous
communications medium, the Internet facilitates the interconnection of
potentially incompatible law regimes. The natural response to such
incompatibility is to seek harmonization or centralization of legal standards
at a supranational level. The case for harmonization or centralization of
regulation at the international level is in many instances compelling.
However, enthusiasm for an international regulatory approach must be
tempered by caution over the potential costs and drawbacks of centralized
hierarchical control. Improperly applied, international Internet regulation
threatens to negate the characteristics that make the network valuable, and
could in fact eliminate the very benefits that network regulation is intended
to preserve.
The cure may therefore be as bad as the disease; at a minimum it
carries with it a variety of troublesome results. In this essay, I briefly
discuss two related cautionary models implicated by the argument for
international regulation. I shall argue that Internet regulation at an
international level may be conceived as a standards setting problem,
presenting, at a multi-national level the same dangers and benefits of
uniformity, competition, and strategic behavior familiar from analyses of
technical standards-setting. This approach arises from the
conceptualization of law as a product, and from potential for interchanging
law and technology as regulatory methods.
I begin by reviewing the interjurisdictional competitive literature
analyzing law as a product. I then extend the basic concepts of that model
to discuss implications of international regulation in light of network
effects in the market for law. I conclude that these models point to only a
limited and particularized case for international regulation in order to
preserve the benefits of decentralized innovation in law. Consequently, in
any given instance, the case for harmonized international regulation must
be evaluated according to its potential for curtailing the competitive
benefits of localized regulatory innovation.
LAW AS A PRODUCT
2005-2006
2
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 8 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol8/iss1/3
LAW AS A NETWORK STANDARD
The problem of transborder data regulation implicates the economic
models developed to analyze interjurisdictional competition. In 1956,
Charles Tiebout published his now classic paper modeling local provision
of public services on a theory of inter-jurisdictional competition that
closely resembles market competition for provision of private goods.I
Tiebout theorized that if citizens are free to migrate between jurisdictions,
competition for desirable citizen immigrants will arise. Local communities
will offer to potential immigrants the most attractive packages of goods and
services at the lowest tax rate possible. Similarly, migrants will relocate to
jurisdictions offering the maximum package of public goods at the tax rate
that the migrant is willing to pay. Local communities may even tailor their
offerings to appeal to particular types of immigrants, and immigrants would
be expected to sort themselves out into groups of similar means and tastes
by jurisdiction.
2
Under Tiebout's approach, the production of local public goods and
services might thus resemble the production of private goods in a
competitive market: competitive pressure from other jurisdictions will
prevent any given jurisdiction from offering too much or too little in the
way of public services.3 Jurisdictions that offer too much will experience
an influx of immigrants from less generous jurisdictions; jurisdictions that
offer too little will experience an exodus to more generous jurisdictions.
Migration in or out of the jurisdiction will continue until parity with
competing jurisdictions is reached.4 These forces therefore act as a check
on over-production or under-production of local public goods. By "voting
with their feet," or exiting, citizens force efficiency in allocation of
resources to such goods.
5
Tiebout's insight was quickly expanded to encompass strategic
preferences of local governments regarding business firms. Just as in the
consumer/citizen model, businesses too may vote with their feet, locating
their operations in jurisdictions that offer the most attractive set of local
public goods. 6 This in turn implies that jurisdictions may tailor their
offerings to attract businesses, or to attract certain kinds of desirable
businesses, or even to repel undesirable businesses.7 In this market for
business migration, the price of migration may take a variety of forms:
jurisdictions may offer anything from tax incentives, land grants, and
liability waivers to museums, sports arenas, and public transportation
1 Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1954).
2 See Martin McGuire, Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdictions, 82 J. POL. ECON.
112 (1974).
3 See Joseph Stiglitz, The Theory of Local Public Goods, in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC
SERVICES: THE TIEBOUT MODEL AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 17, 18 (George R. Zodrow
ed., 1983).
4 See George J. Stigler, Economic Competition and Political Competition, 13 PUBLIC
CHOICE 91, 93 (1972).
5 See DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 126-27 (1979).
6 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON.
23, 28 (1983).
7 See id. at 43; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a
Federal Republic, 89 J. POL. ECON. 152, 157 (1981).
BURN
3
BURK: LAW AS A NETWORK STANDARD
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2006
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
systems. Jurisdictions compete for desirable business emigres by offering
packages of such benefits.
Local law comprises an important component of each jurisdiction's
competitive package. Regulation with economic effects may be tailored to
foster and attract certain industries. For example, environmental
regulations may be eased in order to lower the operating costs of favored
industries. Patent and copyright laws may be strengthened in order to
maximize the economic return to industries that innovate. Corporate and
partnership laws may be designed to accommodate investment and control
structures amenable to certain industries. Indeed, development of desirable
law "products" may be even more important to attract and retain high-value
businesses activity than it is to attract and retain high-value individuals.
This model therefore suggests that competition for business and for
desirable immigrants will prompt jurisdictions to compete with one another
to offer the most attractive law "products" - in effect, creating a market for
law. Optimally, such competition will tend toward not only the production
of law that is differentiated to suit certain business profiles, but also to
produce better and more efficient regulation - the threat of losing
businesses to another jurisdiction will tend to weed out the inefficient legal
regimes. However, it is also possible for this race to the top to become a
"race to the bottom." The Tiebout model assumes that jurisdictions are
tightly compartmentalized so that no external costs or benefits accrue from
the local provision of public services. 9 If jurisdictions are leaky, then
individuals could perhaps enjoy the positive benefits of a neighboring
jurisdiction's policy without actually incurring the cost of migrating there. 
1 0
More significantly, in a world of leaky borders, jurisdictions could lower
the costs to local firms by imposing all or part of those costs on
neighboring jurisdictions.11  This would serve to attract firms, but not
necessarily by generating a net gain in efficiency.
Consequently, in a world of leaky borders, the race to the bottom
might best be characterized as a race to externalize - for jurisdictions to
seek ways to gain at the expense of their neighbors. Because the
externalized costs of such local regulation are imposed upon others,
jurisdictions will tend to overspend on law products, offering immigration
incentives for which they themselves need not pay. The Internet of course
is a source of transborder leakiness, at least for digitized products and for
data migration. This raises the concern that the Internet may trigger such
races to externalize costs, providing a conduit for local costs to be imposed
upon other jurisdictions.
Thus, to take a recent, prominent, and hotly debated example, one
possible characterization of the peer-to-peer music file-sharing
phenomenon, whereby digitized music, software, and movies are shared via
services such as BitTorrent, Kazaa, or similar on-line services, is that
8 See Albert Breton, The Existence and Stability of Interjurisdictional Competition, in
COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 37, 42 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991).
9 Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 71, 83 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
10 See Stiglitz, supra note 3 at 48.
"1 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 5-6 (1993).
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suggesting a race to the bottom. Much of the supply of such files comes
out of jurisdictions with lax copyright law or lax enforcement; indeed,
businesses supplying software for such file-sharing have taken advantage of
the attractive incorporation law and legal immunity provided by small and
somewhat obscure jurisdictions such as the Pacific island of Vanuatu.
Lurking in permissive jurisdictions, these entities free-ride off of the
creativity fostered in protective jurisdictions, using the Internet as a conduit
to bleed legitimate incentives away from the owners and producers of
valuable creative works.
But in branding such a scenario an inefficient "race to the bottom"
we must exercise care. Early analyses of incorporation races among
jurisdictions in the United States branded this race a "race to the bottom," a
race to benefit corporate officers at the expense of shareholders. Later,
more careful analyses suggest that it may in fact have been a "race to the
top," a competition among jurisdictions to produce the best package of
corporate law "products." In making such characterizations, the
perspective adopted may dictate the conclusion.
Thus, in our peer-to-peer file sharing example, a rather different
story might be told using the same facts: in this version, off-shore
encouragement of peer-to-peer entrepreneurship becomes a race to the top,
forcing a bloated and complacent U.S. entertainment industry to revise its
archaic and outmoded business models. On this view, consumer adoption
of digital technology has outstripped the recording industry's sluggish pace
of change, creating a gap between consumer demand and the dated
products provided by entertainment firms. Peer-to-peer entrepreneurship
filled that gap, providing not only innovative distributional services but
also models for traditional entertainment firms to emulate. Without the
harsh market discipline of file sharing, the authorized music downloading
services now beginning to cater to consumer demand might never have
been launched.
A. LAW CARTELS
Where borders leak, however, undesirable transborder migrations
might be curtailed by equalizing the benefits on each side of the border.
Jurisdictions might agree to set a uniform standard for their law products,
removing the incentive to race to the top or to the bottom. Then, much like
a classic private-sector economic cartel, governments that participate in an
international agreement may be able to avoid ruinous competition in the
market for law as a good. By standardizing the law product, they may
succeed in effectively fixing the price for business migration.
Taking copyright as an example in the Internet context, enforcement
of high protectionist standards would prevent cartel nations from lowering
their price to attract information distributors-that is, so-called pirates.
Fixing the price for information distributor migration would in turn allow
domestic producers to avoid foreign information competition and engage in
monopoly overcharge for information products.12 On an international scale,
12 See Easterbrook, supra note 6 at 39.
BURN
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this type of monopoly overcharge effectively taxes non-producing
nations-particularly developing nations-to support the information
producers of the developed world.
13
Such collusive international activity may be highly advantageous to
politicians at the national level. 14  First, through collusion with foreign
politicians, domestic politicians can protect themselves against superior
foreign law products. Exodus of firms to more attractive regulatory
regimes may place domestic politicians and bureaucrats under pressure to
streamline local regulation, perhaps at the expense of favored but
inefficient rent-seeking constituents. Such streamlining may, however, be
avoided by agreement with foreign counterparts to cooperate in suppressing
formulation of more efficient regulation in their respective jurisdictions.
At the same time, local politicians may use an international
agreement to deflect domestic voter dissatisfaction over domestic special
interest legislation, by characterizing the local protectionist measures as a
necessary part of international cooperation. This in essence facilitates
intrajurisdictional externalization of regulatory costs: rather than shifting
costs to other jurisdictions, costs are shifted to a different constituency
within the jurisdiction. 6 Thus, international collusion may prevent not
only exit from correcting political improvidence, but may also suppress the
"voice" of internal constituents from prompting correction.
Returning to the example of peer-to-peer technology, we might
query whether the active campaign for increased intellectual property
protection in the face of widespread file sharing fits this model. Indeed,
this characterization suggests that the fierce lobbying and advocacy
campaigns waged by the entertainment industries have merely been rent-
seeking attempts to preserve their current business position by legislative
fiat, which may be had for an investment in lobbying activity which less
financially burdensome making the sizeable investment necessary to
restructure their outmoded business model. If this characterization is
correct, elevating the results of such lobbying efforts to the international
level only encourages socially inefficient behavior by removing the
possibility of more efficient extraterritorial competition.
However, the success of national protectionists, or any other group
of price-fixers, requires a stable cartel, and cartels of any sort are
notoriously unstable.' 7 Such instability results in part from a sort of
"Prisoner's Dilemma" version of the "race to the bottom" effect. Cartels
extract monopoly profits by agreeing to restrain output so as to be able to
push prices to monopoly levels that would be impossible to maintain if the
members engaged in production at competitive levels. Cartel members
therefore have a strong incentive to cheat: if a cartel member engages at
competitive level production while competitors restrain output, the cheater
can reap enormous profits. But since all members of the cartel are tempted
13 Cf id. (discussing monopoly overcharge as a form of taxation).
14 See Roland Vaubel, A Public Choice View of International Organization, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 32 (Roland Vaubel & Thomas
D. Wilbert eds., 1991).
15 See Breton, supra note 8, at 39-40.
16 See Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory; Competition, Externalization, and
Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 57 (1993).
17 See George J. Stigler, A Theoro, of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1977).
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by this same possibility, one member is unlikely to be able to cheat without
triggering cheating by all the other members, leading back to competitive
pricing and loss of the profits that prompted the cheating.
In the case of private economic cartels, a collusive organization is
believed to be most feasible and stable where the quality of the product is
homogeneous, the price elasticity of demand for the product is low, barriers
to entry are high, all suppliers of the product have similar cost functions,
and there is a dominant supplier who can act as price-leader. 8 In the case
of international collusion over Internet law "products," several of these
requirements may be met by the configuration of participation in law
production.
First, it would appear that the universe of law producers on an
international scale is largely closed, forming something of a barrier to
entry. New nations do not arise with particular frequency, and when they
do, the circumstances of their inauguration -- such as revolution or social
upheaval -- will likely deter information producers from relocating to take
advantage of whatever new law products they choose to offer.
Additionally, accumulation of "legal capital" poses a barrier to jurisdictions
attempting to enter the law product market. In Roberta Romano's classic
analysis of the race to the top for incorporation law in the United States,
firms that incorporated in Delaware repeatedly referred to the large body of
settled case law on corporations as a reason for incorporating there.
1 9
Similarly, nations with a long history of well-developed information law
may be especially attractive to information distributors seeking to locate
their operations, especially if the jurisdiction sports specialty courts with a
high degree of expertise. The certainty offered by a well-developed body
of relevant law may in many instances offer greater business value than
would relaxed regulation of information distribution. New entrants into the
information law market may have their work cut out for them in order to
displace the law products of well-established jurisdictions.
2 0
Price-leadership or "dominant firm" effects may also be seen in the
market for law products. The number of sovereign states is relatively large,
but certain nations, particularly the United States, are able to exert
considerable diplomatic and economic pressure toward conformity. 21 By
promulgating its copyright and patent law products as a proposed standard
for inclusion within the Berne Convention revisions, or TRIPs trade
agreements, 23 the United States has rather successfully attempted to co-
18 See Vaubel, supra note 14, at 33.
19 See Romano, supra note 11 at 258-61, 274-75.
20 Cf. Romano, supra note 11 at 40. ("Legal capital is not as easily duplicated by other
states... because of the start-up costs in developing precedent and the dynamic precedent-
based nature of adjudication by courts.")
21 Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 615-16 (1996); J.H. Reichman, Beyond the Historical
Lines of Demarcation: Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and International
Trade After the GATT's Uruguay Round, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 75, 113 (1993).
22 See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. DigitalAgenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 374 -
75 (1997). The Berne Convention is an international treaty governing copyright and
related rights. Berne Convention for the Protection of Litrary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971 (amended 1979), 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
23 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
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ordinate the international market for such law products. The European
Union has taken much the same approach in promulgating its standards for
24 25data privacy protection and proprietary database protection.
Barriers to product substitution may also exist. The price elasticity
of demand for law products has in the past been tied to firm location,
depending on the type of law in question. The incorporation law of one
state may be an acceptable substitute for that of another, because a firm
need not physically move to make the substitution. However, when firms
must physically move to substitute law "products," they may be locked into
one legal standard by the cost of migration. The Internet itself, by
increasing firm mobility, increases the ability of law "purchasers" to
substitute one jurisdiction's law product for another's. By substantially
lowering or eliminating that cost, the Internet destabilizes the ability of
nations to collectively set an international standard for intellectual property
law.
If the conditions for a stable intergovernmental cartel can be
attained, the expected damage to innovation and competition will follow
naturally from the principles outlined in the literature on law as a product.
First, by homogenizing information law, such as national intellectual
property systems, an international agreement forces international
businesses to operate in a world where "one size fits all." Opportunities for
26jurisdictional experimentation and innovation are curtailed. New
information industries that might have arisen under innovative schemes
may be stifled. Established information industries will be confined to an
international norm, rather than offered the opportunity to select from a
diversity of systems that which is best suited to their operation. As a
corollary effect, information firms will be exposed to greater business risk
because they will be less able to diversify across jurisdictions. Thus, the
international inefficiencies resulting from an international intellectual
property cartel may be no less serious than the inefficiencies resulting from
lack of coordination.
1. LAW CENTRALIZATION
This view of law as a product suggests that, in some situations,
certain types of defection may desirable in order to create interjurisdictional
law competition, but how in other situations defection may lead to an
undesirable race to externalize. If in fact cooperative strategies prove
impossible or unworkable, rational competitors may have yet another
option. If "horizontal" cooperation between jurisdictions proves unstable,
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. See Hamilton, supra note 21. Accession to TRIPS is a
requirement for admission to the World Trade Organization.
24 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2000) (describing EU privacy directive recipriocity requirements).
25 J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 57 (1997) (describing EU database reciprocity requirements).
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the creation of a "third party" standing in a vertical relationship to the
competitors may be necessary. 28 Charles Tiebout recognized this in his
original model by noting that where externalities exist, centralized
decision-making, rather than interjurisdictional competition, may be
required to achieve an efficient outcome. This principle may also be stated
in game theory terms: because states know that their own rational short-
term competitive preferences will inevitably lead to their own detriment in
the long term, states may choose to voluntarily surrender all or part of their
decision-making power to a third party.
The third party approach is in essence the strategy adopted by the
individual states of the U.S. in acquiescing to the constitutional compact
that creates a centralized federal government.29 Similar benefits may be
found in the federal compacts of Canada and Australia, 30 and to some
extent that of the European Union. 3 1 Interestingly, it is also much the
strategy adopted by the GATT signatory nations in creating the World
Trade Organization (WTO). 32  However, any movement toward
centralization should preserve to the extent possible the benefits of
interjurisdictional legal diversity. For example, in the U.S., the benefits of
interstate competition have also been preserved to the extent deemed
practical. 33 Because competitive benefits will be lost in whichever markets
are centralized, centralization must be considered a drastic measure to be
taken only where no such efficiencies are to be had; that is, where
externalities prevent the development of competition in the first instance.
34
Therefore, international centralization for Internet-related information
rights should likewise be approached with a minimalist attitude, if at all.
This type of approach requires a careful consideration as to which areas
truly generate externalities that would undermine information product
creation, as well as careful limitation of the central authority to those
areas.
35
LAW AS A STANDARD
Conceptualizing the centralization of Internet law as international
cartel activity in the market for law implicates another set of economic
28 See Breton, supra note 8, at 48-49.
29 See generally Jaques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of
the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555 (1994).
30 See generally M.J. SPROULE-JONES, PUBLIC CHOICE IN FEDERALISM IN AUSTRALIA AND
CANADA (1975).
31 See James M. Buchanan, Federalism and Individual Sovereignty, 15 CATO J. 259, 266-
67 (1995-96) (discussing federal structure of European Union central governance).
32 See Norio Komuro, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Coverage and
Procedures of the WTO Understanding, 12 J. ARB. 81 (1995). The WTO is the trade
dispute resolution mechanism resulting from the culminating round of negotiations in the
multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note
23; see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(U.S ratification and implementation of WTO agreements).
33 See Richard Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387,
1454 (1987).
34 Cf Breton, supra note 8, at 46.
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models related to the standards setting for technical compatibility.
"Standards" in this context may be defined as a set of technical
specifications that provides common design features for a product or
process.3 6 The potential benefits of uniform technical standards, and the
problems attending incompatible standards, are commonplace knowledge.
37
As any traveler carrying an electrical appliance has discovered, the costs of
non-uniform technical standards can be profound: voltage, current, and
plug configuration vary enormously among different jurisdictions,
requiring either expensive duplication of compatible appliances, or a
panoply of adapters and transformers allowing a non-compatible appliance
to interoperate with the local standards. Coordination of technical design,
even among competitors, is often necessary to avoid the costs and
inconvenience associated with such technical incompatibility.
As an international network, the Internet presents issues related not
only to such actual compatibility of technical products but also to the
virtual compatibility of legal products. Both sets of issues arise as a
consequence of so-called "network effects." Network effects may arise in
situations where the value of a system increases as users are added.
39
Purchasers of such goods find the good increasingly valuable as others also
purchase the good. Typically, the increased value accrues to subsequent
adopters as a positive externality. For example, a telephone system is of
relatively little value if it has only two subscribers; each subscriber can call
only one other person.4 ] The system is of greater value if it has more
subscribers because each subscriber can then communicate with many
others. Those who subscribe to the system after it has accrued a large
number of subscribers may obtain a more valuable service than those who
subscribed early when there were few other subscribers. At the same time,
the value of the service to the early subscribers grows as additional users
sign on to the network.
This insight can be generalized to other types of human artifacts
with shared compatibility: languages, for example, may be thought of as
goods having network effects. The ability to "interoperate" internationally
with a wide diversity of individuals is illustrated by the benefits of speaking
Greek in the ancient Western world, Latin in the Medieval Western world,
or English in the current global era. Many commentators have noted that
computer operating systems tend toward a uniform standard because of the
natural benefits of a uniform standard: users need only invest in learning
the characteristics of the system once, technical support for a single
36 2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 35.1, 35-3 (2002).
37 See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 229 (1999).
38 See Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and
Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2002).
39 See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibiliy, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985).
40 See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon
Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135 (1994) (distinguishing between positive and negative
network effects).
41 See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 44, at 424 (citing telephones as an example of network
effects); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 46, at 139-40 (noting the telephone system as a
paradigmatic example of network effects).
2005-2006
10
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 8 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol8/iss1/3
LAW AS A NETWORK STANDARD
standard is simple to provide, and producers of compatible software
applications need only develop products to function with a single platform.
The Internet is a prime candidate for display of such network
externalities: network access becomes more valuable as it becomes more
ubiquitous. 42 Much of the success of the Internet is due to the creation of a
new type of physical network: the inter-networking protocols on which the
Internet operates allow disparate types of computer hardware, running
many different software systems, to interact on a single network. Thus,
users with previously incompatible equipment can now join the same
system and interoperate. 3 Additionally, any given application run on the
network may show a different kind of network effect from usage: e-mail,
for example, is a more valuable service if it can be used more widely.
Similarly, the World Wide Web becomes more valuable as it accumulates
more reference linkages, allowing more information to be indexed and
accessed.
Both types of network activities are simultaneously possible
because the Internet exhibits more than one type of network effect. Katz &
Shapiro have distinguished between actual and virtual networks. 44 Actual
networks may be characterized as those that physically interoperate with
one another; virtual networks as those that share common features without
direct interoperation. To the extent that the Internet generates benefits to
users by having their machines physically connected to the network,
allowing interaction between users, it represents an actual network. Also,
the benefits accruing from similarity of software platforms or, for that
matter, from the content on the system, comprise a virtual network of
shared compatibility. By providing a common technical standard, the
Internet generates both types of beneficial effects.
The creation of a common standard is often beneficial, and may be
critically important, where network efficiencies can be realized. At the
same time, the potential downside of any standards setting process is
profound.45 Networks may also produce negative effects, as the cost of
leaving the network, even when it would be socially desirable to do so, may
be prohibitively high. The likelihood of being "locked-in" to an inefficient
standard remains a disputed, but serious consideration. 46 The concern is
that once a standard is adopted, network effects may raise the cost of
changing to a newer or better alternative causing the standard to become
permanently entrenched. This may occur where the short-term costs of
switching away from the old standard are greater than the long-term
benefits of the new standard - indeed, it has been argued that development
of new standards may be deterred if network effects raise the short-term
42 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 551 (1998).
43 See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001).
44 See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 93, 95 (1994).
45 See Carl Shapiro, Setting Compatibilioy Standards: Cooperation or Collusion in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 81, 88 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et. al eds., 2001).
46 See Leibowitz & Margolis, supra note 36; S.J. Leibowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The
Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990).
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cost of development and deployment above the perceived savings of a new
standard.
As a consequence, the development of standards carries potential
risks to competition. Eventually, the prevailing standards in a networked
industry might be displaced by the promulgation of new or better standards,
but there is a serious danger of anti-competitive manipulation of the
standards-setting process, or the standard itself, to achieve some form of
market dominance. 47  Standard-setting organizations may cloak
anticompetitive cartel-like activity if their membership is limited and
conditions permit them to control adoption of the standard. 48 Either in or
out of an organizational setting, it has been argued that a dominant industry
player may be able to arrange tipping of the market toward a desired
standard, presumably toward a proprietary standard that can be controlled
or exploited by that producer. Network effects may be manipulated in
these situations to lock users into the standard, frustrating new entry or
technological improvement.
2. LEGAL STANDARD SETTING
Like language or interoperable computer systems, law may also be
characterized as a system with network effects, displaying the same
standardization issues familiar from analysis of technological standards.
49
Legal harmonization facilitates a virtual network of compatible legal
standards. Efficiencies may be realized when interjurisdictional legal
standards are adopted, just as they may be when interjurisdictional
electrical or telecommunications standards are adopted. Such legal
compatibility allows individuals and entities to invest once in learning the
legal system, then apply that investment across multiple jurisdictions.
Indeed, it might be said that law interoperates with law from other
jurisdictions, particularly as capital, goods, and individuals interact or move
across borders. Such movements or transactions may be simultaneously
subject to the legal standards of multiple jurisdictions, resulting in
conflicting demands on the interjurisdictional actor.
Where legal standards differ, or are incompatible, compliance with
applicable law becomes expensive and uncertain. These uncertainties have
long been a focus of concern for Internet-related activities, although this
type of interaction is not unique to Internet activity. 50 Large bodies of
adaptive jurisprudence have grown up around routinely encountered
questions of jurisdiction and choice of law conflicts - negotiating these
complex systems of rules is a daunting task even to those knowledgeable in
their mysteries, and a nearly impossible proposition to the average person
or business entrepreneur. The Internet greatly facilitates such interaction,
connecting individuals and institutions from different jurisdictions and
47 See Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies &
Tactics in Standardization, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 117 (1994).
48 See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations,
90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002).
49 Cf. Radin, supra note 38.
50 See Jack Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998).
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raising the level of virtual movement. Perhaps more importantly, the low
costs of accessing the network also makes such interactions relatively
cheap, placing such them within the purview of small businesses and
average citizens - no longer are transnational interactions relegated to a
relatively few highly-capitalized firms. However, this new cheap access to
world-wide communications also means that interjurisdictional conflicts
may now become commonplace to those least likely to have expertise or
skill in negotiating inconsistent legal regimes. In such circumstances, the
existing framework for conflicts of law may not "scale" well.5 1
Thus the problem of transborder conflicts occasioned by the Internet
may be characterized as a difference of scale, rather than type. But the
Internet reveals an additional dimension of interjurisdictional conflicts
analysis that may have gone previously unrecognized.5 2  The rise of
Internet-based "virtual" interaction dramatically illustrates the
interconnection of legal and technical networks, and implies that law
interoperates with technology. The interconnected technological system of
the network may be considered as an extension of the legal systems arrayed
at the periphery of the net. The technological system of the network
provides a common standard for interjurisdictional interoperation of diverse
legal systems. Yet it must be understood that just as the network is
agnostic toward the applications, platforms, or devices arrayed at its
periphery, so too is it indifferent to the legal networks that it interconnects.
The open architecture and end-to-end design of the network may connect
devices with otherwise incompatible operating systems, or it may connect
jurisdictions with otherwise incompatible legal systems: whether it is Unix-
based machines interoperating with Windows-based machines or
protectionist-based copyright interoperating with access-based copyright,
the network treats them all the same. 53 The result is that the network may
bridge legal systems with radically different goals and expectations.
Most of the legal controversies surrounding the Internet may be
characterized as arising out of this interconnection of incompatible legal
systems, not unlike the problem faced by a traveler attempting to plug into
a foreign electrical grid an appliance not intended for the local voltage or
socket configuration. A variety of Internet-related controversies have
erupted over online activity ranging from the promulgation of pornographic
materials to the sharing of software or music files. The design of the
network, lacking the natural impediments intrinsic to traditional media,
actually facilitates the distribution of problematic information. 54 In some
cases, local reaction has centered on technological solutions, such as
software filters or technological controls. In other cases, the reaction has
been to amend or extend legal sanctions for the offending activity, or to
51 See Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace Revisited, in WHO RULES THE NET?
INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND JURISDICTION 119 (Adam Theirer & Wayne Crews eds.,
2003).
52 Cf Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 501 (1999).
53 Cf. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 43.
54 See Dan L. Burk, Cyberlaw and the Norms of Science, 1999 B.C. INT. PROP. & TECH. F.
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implement some combination of legal and technical prohibitions. These
responses to the electronic dissemination of pornography, private
information, or copyrighted works are essentially attempts to either legally
or technically retrofit the network to comply with the local legal regime.
55
Attempts to retrofit the network to local standards via technological
or cultural add-ons are in essence attempts to adapt a foreign standard to
interoperate with local systems, much as the traveler may attempt to retrofit
a non-conforming device to local voltage, current, or plug configuration by
means of adapters and transformers. The cost of such inconvenience could
be lowered, and a variety of other efficiencies realized, by establishing a
single international standard for legal interoperation, at least interoperation
facilitated via the Internet. On this view, the "harmonization" process for
international Internet law essentially comprises a standards-setting process,
establishing uniform legal standards across multiple jurisdictions.
While this approach offers the benefits of standardization, it carries
with it the same dangers indicated above: there may be serious long-term
costs if Internet law becomes "locked" into a single standard, particularly if
dominant nations act strategically in establishing that standard. As in the
case of technical standards, in standardizing law there is a real danger that
creation of a dominant standard will suppress competition and entry into
the market for law products. Just as firms may behave strategically in the
technical standard-setting process, nations may well behave strategically in
the legal standard-setting process. 56 There is already some evidence that
this is occurring in international harmonization regarding privacy and
intellectual property, where the United States and the European Union
have, respectively, largely eliminated any competing regulatory systems.
57
While the international information law regime may benefit in the short run
from the uniformity engineered by the US and EU dominance in these
areas, there is little opportunity for displacement of these regimes by newer,
possibly more innovative approaches. In this environment, such dominant
law producers may well monopolize the market for Internet law for the
foreseeable future.
55 Id.
56 Cj Radin, supra note 38.
57 See Dan L. Burk, Privacy and Property in the Global Datasphere: International
Dominance of Off-the-shelf Models for Information Control, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CULTURAL ATTITUDES TOWARD TECHNOLOGY
AND COMMUNICATION 363 (Fay Sudaweeks & Charles Ess eds., 2004).
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CONCLUSION
I have suggested here that the costs and benefits of
internationalizing Internet law can be evaluated by adapting models drawn
from the economic analysis of cartel theory and standards setting, as law
may be considered not only a product, but a standard. The equation of law
with interoperable technical standards should hardly come as a surprise.
Students of technological meaning have long held that technology
comprises reified norms. At the same time, law is largely the formal
statement of those norms. 59 The normative meanings of these two cultural
artifacts interact in a complex relationship, both re-shaping and reinforcing
one another. More recently, legal scholars including Reidenberg and
Lessig have suggested and extensively explored the interchangeability of
law and of technological constraints in achieving social policy objectives.
60
This conceptualization of law is in some sense the logical endpoint of the
economic approach conceiving law as a product: if law is an economic
good that competes with similar goods from other producers, so too is law a
product that interoperates with similar products from other producers, as
well as with other systems of complementary or competing products, even
if they take the form of technological standards.
58 Bruno Latour, Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane
Artifacts, in SHAPING TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY: STUDIES IN SOCIOTECHNICAL
CHANGE 225, 244 (Weibe E. Bijker & John Law eds., 1992); Bruno Latour (a.k.a. Jim
Johnson), Mixing Humans and Non-Humans Together: The Sociology of a Door Closer,
35 Soc. PROBS. 298, 306 (1988).
59 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2002).
60 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Joel Reidenberg,
Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76
TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998).
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